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Globalisation and/or Europeanisation?
The Case of Flexicurity
DIMITRIS TSAROUHAS & STELLA LADI
The relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation is conventionally
studied by focusing on the domestic level. In this article we explore this relation-
ship at the international level instead. We examine the way in which the two
phenomena in the form of the ILO and the EU relate to one another. Adopting
a discursive institutionalist approach and focusing on flexicurity, we investigate
whether, how and under what conditions the discourse on flexicurity provides a
point of convergence or divergence between globalisation and Europeanisation.
Our empirical data reveals attempts by the European Commission to use globali-
sation as a legitimating device for a market-accommodating programme for labour
market reform. The ILO remains more sceptical, both about the overall effects of
globalisation and the more concrete uses of flexicurity. Meanwhile, the concept of
flexicurity is subject to change and rearticulation in line with the evolving policy
agenda endorsed by the Commission and/or the member states. The relationship
between Europe and globalisation is thus far from neutral. ‘Europe’ is active in
shaping globalisation; translated into the work undertaken here, Europeanisation
could be conceived as a facet of globalisation rather than as a bulwark to it, or
merely as a process running parallel to it.
Keywords: Europeanisation, globalisation, discourse, flexicurity, EU, ILO
Introduction
Globalisation and Europeanisation are terms with wide-ranging appeal that has
made them popular among politicians, commentators and scientists alike.
Though their trajectory of growth and subsequent popularisation is slightly differ-
ent, their use often tends to be confusing insofar as the two phenomena tend to be
conflated, mistaken for each other or used interchangeably to denote a wide range
of socio-economic changes (Rosamond 2003). To disentangle globalisation from
Europeanisation and in contrast to most of the literature (e.g. Verdier and Breen
2001; Levi-Faur 2004), we focus on the impact of globalisation and
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Europeanisation at the international level rather than the domestic one. In particu-
lar, the comparison here concerns the discourses that the European Union (EU)
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) use to promote or to delimit
the spread of flexicurity. The EU and the ILO are understood as institutional mani-
festations of Europeanisation and of globalisation respectively.
Before proceeding it is important to clarify what the article is not about. First,
we deal with the utilisation and relationship between the two phenomena only. We
thus do not preoccupy ourselves with the series of important questions that arise
once we consider the possibility that these terms are subject to doubt considering
their material effects. This holds true both for globalisation, where the debate
between sceptics and ‘hyperglobalists’ has been going on for some time, and
for Europeanisation. Regarding the latter and considering that we are interested
in the use of the term to understand the thought processes and discursive practices
that key institutions engage in so as to shape their policy agenda, the extent to
which Europeanisation is ‘real’ need not preoccupy us here. Suffice to say that
the literature on the subject has grown exponentially over the last two decades
and now encompasses almost the full range of policies related to European
integration, whether in a ‘bottom-up’, ‘top-down’, ‘multilevel’, ‘regulatory’ or
other manner.
We should also clarify why we look at the issue of discourse through the prism
of flexicurity. The onset of globalisation defined as an accelerated pace of econ-
omic liberalisation leading to the gradual dislocation of capital from its ‘home
base’ has also affected labour markets. By looking at a concrete manifestation
of labour market policies, namely flexicurity, we seek to understand the wider pro-
cesses of policy construction at global and European levels, demonstrate the lin-
kages between the two and assess their origins and policy impact. Moreover,
flexicurity is a helpful case because, as the article demonstrates, it is a concept
developed at EU level and thus linked to Europeanisation. Therefore, even if it
is difficult to establish direct causality, there are more linkages between Europea-
nisation and the spread of flexicurity compared, say, to ‘Americanisation’.
Our empirical data reveals consistent attempts by the European Commission to
use globalisation as a legitimating device for a market-accommodating pro-
gramme of labour market reform. The ILO remains more sceptical, both about
the overall positive effects of globalisation and the more concrete uses of flexicur-
ity in changing the labour market. Nevertheless, the ILO approach on flexicurity is
heavily influenced by EU activism on the field, and EU leadership in communicat-
ing flexicurity beyond Europe is accepted by the ILO. Meanwhile, the concept of
flexicurity is subject to change in line with the evolving policy agenda endorsed by
the Commission and/or the member states. These findings allow us to argue that
the relationship between Europe and globalisation is far from neutral or passive.
To the contrary, ‘Europe’ as an institutional and political actor is active in
shaping globalisation (Jacoby and Meunier 2010). Translated into the work under-
taken here, Europeanisation could be conceived as a facet of globalisation rather
than as a bulwark to it, or merely as a process running parallel to it.
The theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism (DI) is helpful in
our analysis (Schmidt 2008). Comparing the way the discourse on flexicurity is
co-ordinated and communicated by the EU and the ILO allows us to observe
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instances of convergence and divergence between the two organisations and as a
result demystify the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation. An
asset of this article is that the comparison of discourses takes place at a multi-
level environment, which is inherently complex, and thus reveals the strengths
as well as weaknesses of the coordinative–communicative discourse dichotomy
that discursive institutionalism employs.
The article begins with a discussion of the literature linking globalisation and
Europeanisation to introduce our research design and focus. We go on to
explain how discourse is operationalised as well as why DI is useful for our pur-
poses. We then apply this framework to the cases of the EU and ILO, respectively.
We investigate whether, how and under what conditions the discourse of flexicur-
ity provides a point of convergence or divergence between the two organisations.
The conclusion summarises the main results and links our empirical findings with
the article’s theoretical concerns.
Comparing the phenomena of globalisation and Europeanisation
The analysis of the relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation is not
an easy task. Both phenomena are multi-dimensional and their definitions often
abstract. Rosamond (2008) has shown that the two terms are deployed and devel-
oped by policy communities in line with a set of material as well as normative
policy positions. This article attempts to limit this vast spectrum by investigating
their relationship at the international level. In particular, it focuses on the relation-
ship between globalisation and Europeanisation and how they translate into pol-
icies in the field of labour markets. The main question is whether we can
distinguish between the two and thus between the policies they promote.
Both terms are used in the literature to describe how interdependence and inte-
gration at the international level affect the institutions, functions, discourses and
policies of states. In this article globalisation is understood as a phenomenon
that does not cause the decrease of state sovereignty but does cause changes in
its functions and structures (Cerny 1996: 617–37). As far as Europeanisation is
concerned, Radaelli’s (2003: 3) well-known definition is adopted, according to
which the term Europeanisation describes ‘processes of (a) construction, (b) dif-
fusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures,
policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and
politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, politi-
cal structures, and public policies’. In this article, it is argued that in order to
explore the relationship between the two phenomena we need to understand
how they affect each other and not only how they affect the domestic level.
The debate on the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation has
been increasing in the last few years. There is agreement that globalisation and
Europeanisation are closely related, but there are differences regarding the
degree of integration of the two phenomena (Ladi 2006). One approach claims
that Europeanisation is a ‘filter’ for globalisation (Wallace 2000) or even an ‘anti-
dote’ to globalisation (Graziano 2003). Europeanisation as a ‘filter’ signifies the
capacity of the EU for deep co-operation on issues of political economy as well
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as on other issues, which allows for a selective reaction to the pressures of globa-
lisation (Wallace 2000). Europeanisation as an ‘antidote’ refers to the capacity of
Europeanisation to act not only as a filter but also to promote policies and insti-
tutions that affect the same processes of globalisation towards more socially
just policy developments. Graziano (2003) wonders whether in the future we
will be able to talk about the ‘Europeanisation of globalisation’. What is charac-
teristic of this approach is that the EU is seen as mediating between the state and
globalisation, which means that it is understood not as part of globalisation but as
external to it.
A different approach conceives globalisation as the main force that drives inter-
national change and sees Europeanisation as following the trends set out by glo-
balisation. For example, Levi-Faur (2004) in a study of the liberalisation of
telecoms and electricity regimes of EU and non-EU member states comes to the
conclusion that Europeanisation matters in a less obvious and less critical way
than globalisation. This finding is confirmed by the study of the Spanish and
Portuguese telecommunications and electricity sectors (Jordana et al. 2006).
Della Sala (2004) in his study of public sector reforms in Italy comes to the
same conclusion. The argument is that Europeanisation plays an indirect role in
the process of change and that there are global pressures that are more prominent.
Verdier and Breen (2001) apply a quantitative research design in four different
dimensions and observe that in policy areas such as the labour market and the
capital market it is globalisation that mainly accounts for change while in electoral
competition and centre-local government relations the EU plays an important role.
A reverse argument is put forward by Scharpf (2002). In his study of the
European Social Model (ESM) he shows that, if anything, the European Union
has limited the options of member-states to ‘supply-side strategies involving
lower tax burdens, further deregulation and flexibilization of employment con-
ditions, increasing wage differentiation and welfare cutbacks’ (Scharpf 2002:
649). He further argues that World Trade Organization (WTO) rules are less con-
straining, highlighting that it is not globalisation that limits states’ choices on
social policy. This is an interesting conclusion, which is in accordance with our
own finding about the ILO being less sanguine than the EU on the benefits of flex-
icurity. Scharpf’s argument could signify the ‘Europeanisation of globalisation’,
not as Graziano imagines it but rather as an additional push towards liberalisation.
Scharpf’s line of argument is taken further by reversing the logic that most EU
scholars have been following and actually explore the way the EU affects globa-
lisation. Jacoby and Meunier (2010) in their review remind us that the EU has been
essential in shaping the global environment. They argue that the main mechanisms
used by the EU include writing the rules of globalisation (for instance on global
trade), transferring European regulations and standards to the global level and
serving as a model for the international community. Their analysis is based on
examples that concern the economic aspects of globalisation and Europeanisation
but their claims could be generalised. This article, in agreement with Jacoby and
Meunier, claims that the EU is active in shaping globalisation by transferring flex-
icurity at the global level and by serving as a model for the international commu-
nity in the field of labour market policies. This then means that Europeanisation
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can be described as one of the key facets of globalisation rather than a mere fol-
lower of policy options shaped and led by the alleged imperatives of globalisation.
A variety of research designs has been applied in the studies aiming to relate
globalisation with Europeanisation. What most of them have in common is that
they attempt to distinguish the effects of globalisation from those of Europeanisa-
tion at the domestic level. One approach is to look at country specific case studies
(Graziano 2003; Della Sala 2004). The advantage of this approach is the resulting
in-depth empirical analysis shedding light on the different effects of the two
phenomena. A second strategy is to select specific sectors or dimensions of dom-
estic politics where change is underway and offer a comparative quantitative
analysis (Verdier and Breen 2001; Levi-Faur 2004). The strength of that approach
is that it is possible to discover different effects of Europeanisation and globalisa-
tion on different sectors depending, for example, on how liberalised or deregulated
they are. Although there are advantages in these approaches there are aspects of
the globalisation–Europeanisation relationship that remain hidden through this
type of research. The design proposed here differs in the unit of analysis that is
compared, namely neither countries nor policy sectors. Instead, we compare inter-
national organisations and in particular the discourses that the EU and the ILO use
to promote or to delimit the spread of flexicurity.
Hay and Rosamond (2002) discuss the way discourses matter in policy making
in different European countries. For them ‘it is the ideas that actors hold about the
context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs
the way in which actors behave’ (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 148). The authors
show that some European countries blame the EU and not globalisation for
similar (and painful) social and economic reforms that other member states
have attributed to globalisation. This conclusion underscores the importance of
discourse regarding globalisation and Europeanisation. We suggest that in order
to shed light on the relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation the
deployment of the discourse of flexicurity at the international (ILO) and European
(EU) level has to be further explored. The theoretical and methodological tools of
discursive institutionalism are of great assistance to this exercise.
Discursive institutionalism has been outlined by Schmidt (2008) as a fourth
type of institutionalism distinct from the rational choice, historical and sociologi-
cal versions. It reflects the turn to ideas and discourse in political science (Hall
1993; Blyth 2002). Institutions are understood as the context within which
agents think, speak and act and at the same time as the result of agents’ thoughts,
words and actions. Discourse as developed in DI describes the substantive content
of ideas but also the interactive process by which ideas are spread.
Discourse is not just about ideas or ‘text’ but also, as in Hay and Rosamond
(2002), about the context in which the ideas are developed and promoted. Hay
and Smith (2010), point to the strategic use of discourse by policy-makers
aiming to insulate otherwise problematic policy positions from criticism. In so
doing they add a necessary layer of complexity to a discourse based approach
by alerting us to the need to keep the distinction between private and public dis-
course in mind. Moreover, Hay and Rosamond (2002) stress the conscious depic-
tion of both globalisation and European integration as external imperatives driving
a reform course with which policy-makers may not wish to be associated, not least
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because of the expected electoral backlash that such a course (fiscal austerity and
welfare retrenchment) is associated with. Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 193) clarify
that the study of discourse should coexist with the awareness that interests also
matter, as well as material conditions and ‘hard’ economic variables. Empirically,
what is interesting is to shed light on cases where discourse proves central in the
development of events and to pick the exact time and the agents that are respon-
sible for its development. This is what we aim to do in our case study of flexicurity.
Operationalising discourse and the concept of flexicurity
To detect how the discourse on flexicurity is utilised we distinguish between the
coordinative and communicative aspects of the EU and ILO discourses so as to
locate points of convergence and divergence between forces of Europeanisation
and globalisation. We focus on the Commission due to its extensive role in
shaping the relevant discourse, although the cooperation between the European
Council and the Commission means that it is an EU discourse that emerges
after all. Such an approach has thus far been largely overlooked in the literature
and thus has not been fully utilised. The application of the coordinative and com-
municative discourse classification at a multi-level environment demonstrates the
complexity of discourse. Discourse is a dynamic phenomenon that, depending on
the exact time of the examination, can present more, or less, coordinative and/or
communicative characteristics.
Coordinative discourse takes place within the institution concerned and refers
to the ‘creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas’
by policy actors and the way they exchange views and persuade each other. It
is concerned with the formation of a common language on the part of policy-
makers in their attempt to construct a coherent policy programme (Schmidt
2002: 171) and focuses on the promoters of ideas. This is not to say that all
members of an institution or group are equal in the formation of coordinative dis-
course; policy entrepreneurs maintain an advantage as they are tasked with gener-
ating and propagating ideas to others (Peters 2011). Our discussion below on
asymmetrical power relationships in formulating discourse confirms that view.
The construction of coordinative discourse is even more complex at multi-level
environments such as the EU and the ILO. Communicative discourse is concerned
with ideas themselves and the attempt to convince about their appropriateness. It
refers to ‘the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the
general public’ (Schmidt 2008: 310). Communicative discourse, similarly to the
coordinative variant, can be said to be more complex at multi-level environments
where many agents act and rarely speak with exactly the same voice, even after
decisions are made and international agreements are signed. From a methodologi-
cal point of view, the depiction and articulation of communicative discourse is an
easier task compared to the coordinative variant, as publicly available data offers a
fairly reliable avenue of evaluating it. Coordinative discourse in contrast mainly
emerges through personal interviews and direct communication with policy
actors.
Flexicurity is a concept whose origins lie at national level. It was first
implemented by the Danish government in 1993 as well as the Dutch
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administration in the 1990s through its Flexibility and Security Act (Viebrok and
Clasen 2009: 7). The approach soon reaped benefits in that it combined employ-
ment growth with a large cut in the then burgeoning Danish deficit. A similar
success in the Netherlands led to attempts by the European Commission to
export flexicurity elsewhere in the Union. In so doing the Commission was sup-
ported by a series of newly elected governments in the EU, not least in the UK,
favouring a Third Way-type approach to labour market policy (Giddens 1998).
That approach promised to reconcile the demands of capital and labour by offering
more flexibility to business in return for employee protection. The origins of the
concept is thus a highly important issue and can reveal different layers of coordi-
native and communicative discourse between the member states before it was
adopted by the EU, which is the moment at which the present analysis begins
(see Antoniades 2008). Space limitations do not allow us to analyse this issue
here further.
How is the term to be understood? There is not one definition that includes the
entire spectrum of policies potentially covered under the term, and its meaning
is contested. In fact, one could speak of competing definitions of the term.
Employers and some governments saw in it a way of cutting down on welfare
and enhancing profitability through a ‘less rigid’ (that is, less worker-friendly)
‘hire-and-fire’ legislative framework. Meanwhile labour representatives sought
to interpret it as a method of enhancing employee security through investment
in education, the upgrading of skills and adequate welfare support in times of
unemployment.
It has been argued that since the early 2000s flexicurity has meant a turn
towards workfare-like employment programmes stressing ‘employment’
policy instead of the more comprehensive ‘labour market policy’ that the
Danish authorities had adopted in the 1990s (Jørgensen 2011). Flexicurity is
an evolving concept subject to different agendas at both national and EU
level. As the purpose of this article is not to analyse the concept itself we
limit ourselves to defining it as a European way of dealing with globalisation
(Antoniades 2008: 333) that seeks to bridge the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ inclination to
instil more ‘flexibility’ in the labour market with the ‘Continental’ approach
that favours balancing flexibility with employee protection. This underlines
the European origins of the concept and facilitates its use to depict processes
of Europeanisation.
Finally, it is crucial to stress that for the purposes of our article the EU is linked
to Europeanisation as it constitutes its main source, while the ILO is a case study
of an international organisation and a global standards-setter in labour market
policy and employment issues. This has been especially true since the 1990s,
when the ILO started the promotion of its policy agenda centred on the need
to adopt and implement Core Labour Standards (CLS). Furthermore, the ILO
has with time gained a stronger international presence and raised its visibility,
not least through its enhanced cooperation with the IMF and the World
Bank to promote a ‘labour friendly’ development agenda. The fact that the
2009 G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh invited the ILO to submit a report on weather-
ing the global economic crisis is indicative of its recently enhanced profile
(ILO 2009b).
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Sources and methods
To analyse the extent and function of coordination and communication in the EU
and ILO discourse we rely on process-tracing. Primary documentation stemming
from the European Council, the Council Secretariat and the European Commis-
sion is used to understand the usage and the meaning ascribed to flexicurity by
the Union. These take the form of policy reports, opinions, consultation docu-
ments and communications. The same is done for the ILO, as we trace the official
policy pronouncements of the organisation in its annual Conference, in Regional
Meetings, and International Labour Office data, reports and publications. To
obtain a full picture of both organisations’ discursive practices and to reveal
their discursive points of convergence or divergence, we also conducted first-
hand interviews with senior officials from the European Commission and the
ILO and followed these up with personal communications when the need arose
to clarify a few issues.
The EU’s discourse on flexicurity
Distinguishing between the EU’s coordinative and communicative discourse on
flexicurity is interesting because it reveals a much more diverse set of actors parti-
cipating in the coordination of the discourse than in its communication. The actors
that interact for the coordination of the flexicurity discourse include the European
Commission, the European Council, member state governments, the European
Experts’ Group and the social partners, that is, the European Trade Union Confed-
eration (ETUC), the European Employers’ and Industrialists’ associations (CEEP
and BusinessEurope), the European Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Euro-
chambres) and the organisation for SMEs and craft organisations (UEAPME).
Moreover, their power relationship is highly asymmetrical, as a business view
on flexicurity is expressed by multiple actors whereas ETUC is the sole voice repre-
senting labour on the flexicurity debate. When it comes to communicating dis-
course, this task is limited to the Commission and the European Council.
Before discussing the coordinative and communicative discourse of the EU
further, it is important to mention that one important dimension of the relationship
between globalisation and Europeanisation concerns the role of political leader-
ship in shaping a particular discourse about globalisation and the role of the EU
in it. Concretely, the European Commission’s discourse on the subject has been
transformed over time, and a comparison between the Delors era and subsequent
rhetorical action by the Commission highlights this crucial point.1
The Delors era saw an attempt to support policies that highlighted the salience
of the ESM as a bulwark to pure market liberalism (Jepsen and Pasqual 2005:
234). Under the leadership of Delors, economic integration and social policy
went hand in hand, and that was due to the Commission President’s desire to
achieve upward harmonisation of socio-economic standards in the context of a
‘European model of society’ (Hay et al. 1999: 7). This was a political strategy,
expressed in initiatives regarding social partnership and social policy legislation,




Yet the post-Delors era is marked by a different stance by the Commission.
Over time, the latter came to embrace a particular mode of the ESM that saw it
as a European solution to a constructed policy problem, namely that of lack of
competitiveness. The difference with the Delors era could not be clearer. Social
policy, and the notion of flexicurity among others, became part of an attempt to
equip the individual with capacities allowing her to survive the pressures of a com-
petitive, globalised economy instead of conceiving it as a solid pillar of the
European model of society. This conceptualisation was part of an attempt to
boost EU legitimacy and construct a European identity based on sharing not
only problems, but also increasingly notions and concepts (Jacobsson 2004),
one of which is flexicurity.
Coordinative discourse
The European Commission started referring to the concept in the 2000 Lisbon
Strategy and the perceived successes of flexicurity at national level. In 2001 the
Employment Guidelines included an explicit reference to the need to achieve a
better balance between private and working life by combining flexibility with
security (Wilthagen and Tros 2004: 168). In 2003 and 2005 the Guidelines
were revised to reflect a balance between flexibility and employee security in
labour market reform. After the 2006 Villach meeting on social and employment
policy the concept of flexicurity was officially adopted by the Commission and
since 2007 flexicurity and associated policy concepts are part of the European
Employment Strategy (EES) (Tangian 2007: 553) and were included in the
2008–2010 EES Guidelines. The Villach Summit was very important: though
only an informal meeting of the Employment and Social Affairs Council, it
came up with a working definition of flexicurity that centred on four components:
‘Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, effective active labour market
policies, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies and modern social security
systems’ (Mailand 2010: 244; Council Presidency 2006. In this section it is
shown that globalisation has played a primary role in the EU’s coordinative dis-
course on flexicurity.
The precise definition of flexicurity and thus its coordinative discourse
remained contested and the European Council requested that the Commission
come up with common flexicurity principles. These could then be integrated in
the Lisbon Strategy and be part of the National Reform Programmes. In 2006 a
Commission Green Paper called for ‘open dialogue’ on how to understand flexi-
curity, a process that would involve ‘member state governments, social partners
and other relevant stakeholders’. In a 2007 Communication the Commission out-
lined eight principles. Flexicurity meant ‘flexible and reliable contractual arrange-
ments, modern social security systems, effective labour market policies, a balance
between rights and responsibilities as well as internal and external flexicurity’ to
help employees make beneficial labour market transitions (European Commission
2007b: 4).
The Commission sought to coordinate its discourse on flexicurity with the rel-
evant social partners, primarily ETUC, CEEP and BusinessEurope. These ‘stake-
holders’ would have the opportunity to address the Commission directly as they
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are official EU social partners since the Maastricht Treaty. Their different
responses reveal their divergent views on the concept. While the ETUC worried
that flexicurity was turning into an issue associated with ‘flexible’ (easy) layoffs
(ETUC 2007), BusinessEurope welcomed the Commission’s initiative since flex-
icurity could help member states tackle ‘structural labour market problems’. A
positive approach was also echoed by Eurochambres and UEAPME (Euractiv
2007).
Thus, part of the flexicurity approach endorsed by the Commission is the need
to maintain financially sound budgetary policies since ‘flexicurity policies have
budgetary costs’, pay particular attention to SME needs when considering the
financial implications of a flexicurity programme and use social protection pol-
icies to facilitate workers’ mobility (European Commission 2007b: 9). While
the cornerstone of flexicurity’s interpretation is geared towards enhancing EU
competitiveness primarily by facilitating enterprise restructuring, the approach
is described as a ‘win-win’ strategy consistent with the ESM. This aspect of the
EU discourse results from the member states’ desire to see their national priorities
reflected in the concept so as to adjust it to their own political and economic cir-
cumstances (Antoniades 2008).
The Commission’s discourse is promoting a particular labour market pathway
that goes through the implementation of a particular type of flexicurity. This dis-
course is essentially twofold. First, it asserts that flexicurity emerges in parallel to
globalisation’s inevitable arrival and second, is intimately connected to techno-
logical change and the revolution the latter has caused in the production, consump-
tion and lifestyle habits of employers, employees and citizens alike. According to
the Commission flexicurity is the logical point of arrival following technological
progress, which is inevitably bound to affect peoples’ working lives at different
levels (Interviews 2 and 3). The 2007 European Experts’ Group identified four
factors that led to structural economic change. Two of them are the ‘rapid devel-
opment of new technologies’ and the ‘fast pace of international economic inte-
gration’ (European Expert Group 2007: 8).
The second paragraph of a 2007 Commission Communication reads as follows:
‘Overall, globalisation is beneficial for growth and employment, but the change it
brings requires rapid responses from enterprises and workers’ (European Commis-
sion 2007a: 3). There is little doubt therefore that globalisation ought to be wel-
comed as a process that enhances Europe’s welfare. The next step should be to
make fuller use of its allegedly beneficial effects by preparing both the workforce
and enterprises for globalisation’s set of inescapable ‘demands’.
Writing on behalf of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), Liddle
and Lerais argue in a Consultation Paper to the European Commission entitled
‘Europe’s Social Reality’ that globalisation does little else than accelerate
already existent trends within the ESM, trends related to deindustrialisation, an
ageing society and technological change. Hence, ‘it is a myth to believe in a time-
less European social model which has now been subject to a “globalisation
shock”’ (Liddle and Lerais 2007: 7). 2
The relationship between globalisation and the ESM is thus framed in such a
way that makes: (1) the process of change endogenous to ESM and not the
result of a need to respond to globalisation, (2) the necessity of change inescapable
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and (3) the direction of change towards more flexible labour market arrangements
inevitable, considering that globalisation comes together with pressure for
enhanced levels of competitiveness.
As the Commission states in its 2007 Communication on flexicurity:
To confront the multiple challenges of a fast-evolving global
economy and an ageing workforce, the European Union needs to
find new and better ways of making its labour markets more flex-
ible while at the same time providing new and better forms of
employment security. (European Commission 2007a: 1)
Clearly then, flexicurity may (or indeed ought to) take different forms in different
member states. But the challenge to Europe’s economic standing and social cohe-
sion is said to be common to all, and flexicurity serves as a rallying cry to bring
diverse systems under a common roof operating on the basis of a common flexi-
curity manual. In this vein the Commission launched the ‘Mission for Flexicurity’
in 2008, an expert group comprising diverse stakeholders (Commission, European
Council, social partners) to ‘promote the implementation of flexicurity in different
national contexts by raising the profile of the flexicurity approach’ (emphasis
added, European Council 2008: 4).
More evidence pointing to the Commission’s activism has emerged. Officials
from the Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs have pushed
for flexicurity in the formative stages in 2006 to strengthen the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES) and reconcile the different views on flexicurity that existed
among European Council members (Mailand 2010: 244). In 2007 it was again
Commission officials who arranged a last minute compromise between the
social partners on flexicurity ahead of the European Council meeting of that
year, aware of the persisting differences between member states (Mailand 2010:
248). Such activism has allowed flexicurity to remain high on the agenda and
be perceived, albeit with increasing scepticism on the part of the unions, as a
satisfactory response by the EU to the ‘challenge of globalisation’ (see also
Antoniades 2008).
This is corroborated by evidence stemming from both the Commission and
Council (Secretariat and the Employment Committee [EMCO]). The Council Sec-
retariat, in flexicurity-related documents sent to the Employment Social Affairs,
Health and Consumer Affairs Committee (EPSCO) in 2007 and 2008 uses a
necessarily guarded language on flexicurity. It repeats the mantra of inevitable
globalisation and technological change, sees those as necessitating ‘far-reaching
economic restructuring’ and identifies flexicurity as a solution because it allegedly
allows both employees and employers to ‘take a wider view’ on the issue of
restructuring (European Council 2008: 4).
The EU’s coordinative discourse is to a large extent driven by the Commis-
sion on whom the European Council relies to coordinate national positions and
engage in dialogue with stakeholders. Both the Commission and the European
Council use a discourse that links flexicurity to globalisation’s alleged real
policy impact and its inescapable constraints and challenges. This, in turn, is
a reflection of policy choices made by member states at the domestic level
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and which they wish to see reflected at EU level and beyond (Interviews 3 and
4). In that context, then, it is convenient for member states to argue that the
‘necessities’ of globalisation call for the adoption of flexicurity. In other
words, a particular type of interpretation is ascribed to globalisation, which
then combines with domestic political imperatives to push flexicurity on the
EU agenda. Finally, this leads to an EU coordinative discourse that continu-
ously stresses the influence of globalisation on its policy choices.
Communicative discourse
The Commission is the EU’s protagonist in communicating a particular type of dis-
course on flexicurity. This is both because of its institutional role regarding coordi-
nation, and its desire to enhance its own role within the EU by highlighting the
significance of flexicurity and policies, such as the EES, that flow from it. It is impor-
tant that in this type of discourse globalisation is used less as an empirical reality and
more as a conceptual framework that necessitates action in establishing a ‘European
labour market’. The Council of the European Union stresses the need to:
Promote the awareness of citizens of flexicurity policies and their
importance for the reform of European economic and social
models. (emphasis added, Council of the European Union 2007: 3)
The use of plural on Europe’s diverse socio-economic systems is a confirmation of
an empirical reality but also a potent reminder of divisions between European
Council members regarding flexicurity. It is for that reason that the Expert
Group chaired by Ton Whilthagen identified four ‘pathways to flexicurity’.
These reflect some of the common challenges faced by member-states, but had
to be drafted in a general manner so as not to identify particular member-states
and not exclude others. The pathways entail ‘tackling contractual segmentation’,
flexicurity within the firm, tacking opportunities and skills gaps among the work-
force and improving labour market chances for benefit recipients and the infor-
mally employed (European Expert Group 2007).
In a 2006 Communication the Commission argues for the need to see flexicurity
in a pan-European context:
It is important to put the issue of flexicurity in the broader context
of the European employment strategy and at the same time not to
make the flexicurity discussion into a debate about any of the indi-
vidual components alone. (European Commission 2006: 1)
This would then allow the Commission to retain a commanding role in the process.
In this 2006 document the Commission makes clear that the aim of strengthening
the EES through flexicurity ought not to be hampered by individual preferences
for one or other flexicurity element. Instead, it is the adoption of flexicurity by
more and more member states that becomes the goal, leaving the actual content
of labour market policy resulting from this adoption a bit vague.
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In its Communication entitled Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity the
Commission emphasised that the Lisbon targets need to be fulfilled by member
states ‘and the Union’ so as to secure that ‘Europe’ can adjust to the ‘shocks
imposed on its economy’ (European Commission 2007b: 3). The common
principles were put in place so that member states would learn from each other.
Moreover, mutual learning and benchmarking should be used to successfully
implement the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission 2007b: 10).
By 2010 and whilst assessing the Lisbon project, the Commission declared that
member states had moved forward with flexicurity in terms of policy learning and
within the context of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the preferred way of
Europeanising labour market policy at EU level (European Commission 2010: 7).
The document argued that flexicurity had been a success and represented the
ability of ‘Lisbon to stimulate and frame policy debates and generate mutually
acceptable solutions’ (European Commission 2010: 3). The discourse on flexicurity
was thus utilised by the Commission to push forward its agenda on the Europeani-
sation of labour market policy.
In 2011 the Commission adopted its ‘Europe2020 Agenda for new skills and
jobs’ aiming inter alia at an employment rate of 75 per cent by the year 2020
(European Commission 2011). Stressing that flexicurity had helped many
member states weather the economic crisis yet vulnerable groups had been hit
hard by it, the document underlined the need to strengthen flexicurity in the
post crisis period and rebalance its four components to adjust to the new environ-
ment (European Commission 2011: 7–8).
Such a discourse allows the EU and in particular the Commission to portray
flexicurity not only as congruent with its vision of Europe’s political economy
but also as a paradigm that balances employee and employers’ interests.
However, as Keune and Jepsen (2007) point out, there is little intrinsically new
in this debate. Member states have long been using elements of flexicurity in
their domestic systems. Their record in combining flexibility with security is
mixed, depending on a whole series of institutional factors most of which have
little to do with the alleged ‘imperatives of globalisation’. It is therefore plausible
to argue that the Commission has sought to utilise this debate to disseminate its
preferred knowledge on how to deal with contemporary ‘economic realities’,
and at the same time strengthen its institutional position within the Union.
The ILO and its discourse on flexicurity
Analysing the ILO discourse an even more interesting trend is revealed. Similarly
to the EU, discourse coordination involves more actors than its communication. In
support to the key argument advanced in this article, we find that the European
Commission plays a central role both in the coordinative and the communicative
discourse of the ILO.
In discourse coordination key actors are the Secretary General, the International
Labour Office (the organisation’s permanent secretariat), the Governing Body and
the European Commission while in its communication it is the International
Labour Office and the European Commission. Due to the nature of the ILO (dis-
cussed below) power relationships here are fairly equitable regarding the
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discourse on flexicurity, as workers and employers’ groups retain an equally
powerful say in the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILO Secretariat can be
seen as equivalent to the European Experts’ Group, offering specialised advice
based on technical reports and policy documentation backed by evidence.
Coordinative discourse
The ILO was formed in 1919 and was based on an institutional structure consisting
of state representatives, ‘workers’ (trade unions) and ‘employers’ (employers’
organisations). Managing to survive the demise of the League of Nations and
flourishing in the post-war years through its 1944 Philadelphia Declaration, the
ILO was the first specialised UN agency (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 14). In oper-
ationalising the organisation’s coordinative discourse and taking into account its
role in promoting a global labour market agenda we focus on coordination
between the ILO and the EU. Coordinative discourse of the type that the EU
engages in is not taking place at the ILO level due to the organisation’s
decision-making structure.3
The latter centres on the annual International Labour Conference, where Con-
ventions and Recommendations are issued and labour standards are adopted.
Every state sends a delegation comprising state officials, workers and employers.
While state representatives can vote individually, workers and employers are
appointed by their government. Majority voting is the rule, and a two-thirds
majority is required for the adoption of conventions and recommendations. The
Conference agenda is set by the powerful Governing Body, consisting of 28 gov-
ernment members, 14 worker and 14 employer members. The Governing Body, in
which the most powerful industrialised states have 10 guaranteed seats (the
remaining 18 rotate every three years), elects the Secretary-General. Finally, the
International Labour Office supervises the organisation’s technical assistance pro-
grammes and issues a wealth of reports, studies and data that underpin the work of
the Governing Body.
In essence, decisions at the ILO are reached by consensus and extensive infor-
mal consultation prior to final decision making. Moreover and despite the fact that
on occasion employers vote differently than workers and state representatives,
workers, employees and state officials follow a process of continuous internal
coordination (Boockman 2003). This important difference with the EU
decision-making structure makes the degree and extent of coordination between
the ILO and EU member states an important factor in our analysis.
Evidence suggests that the Commission leads the attempt to put flexicurity prin-
ciples into practice and works closely with the ILO to do so. Commonly agreed
policies are important. The two organisations established a formal dialogue in
2001 through an Exchange of Letters and proceeded with a Memorandum of
Understanding establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ in the field of development.
The Memorandum entailed common EU–ILO action on the social dialogue,
employment and labour standards, all of which are linked to flexicurity (European
Commission 2004). That agreement reflected the EU decision to change its earlier
approach in promoting core labour standards. Rather than relying on ‘social
clauses’ when concluding trade agreements with third states, it now sought to
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promote social standards through ‘dialogue, stimulation and negation within the
ILO’ (Eichhorst et al. 2010: 19).
A 2008 ILO document claims that flexicurity is an ‘indispensable part of the
European Social Model’ and makes frequent references to EU activism on flexi-
curity (ILO 2008: 10). The EU influences ILO work in various ways. The EU del-
egation in the annual ILO Conference is a key actor: ‘when the EU takes the floor,
delegates stay in the room to listen’ (Interview 1). It is important to note that this is
not necessarily a reflection of the EU leading by example. Kissack (2009) has
shown that while all EU states have ratified the ILO’s Core Labour Standards
so have another 101 states around the world. The EU’s normative ability to
shape the ILO debate is not necessarily accompanied by its showing of leadership
in a more practical way.
The EU has been able to coordinate its stance on ILO matters and thus exert
more influence on the organisation’s policy orientation (Saenen and Orbie
2011). The Annual High Level Meetings allow the EU to influence ILO percep-
tions (Interview 5) but coordination on the part of the EU is also institutionalised.
Before and during every International Labour Conference (ILC) the member
states, the Commission and the Presidency meet in Geneva and formulate their
position based on the complexity and sensitivity of the topic on the agenda
(Saenen and Orbie 2011: 5).
The Commission is a nonvoting observer within the ILO structure and the EU
does not ratify ILO Conventions. Yet the Commission is a discursive coordinator
in setting the space within which ‘acceptable’ logics can be formulated in support
of a policy position (Nedergaard 2008). Furthermore, the Commission promotes
its policy agenda and sends its delegation to the ILO through the European
Regional Group, since the ILO allows for the establishment of regional groups
(Johnson 2003). Moreover, the Commission signed a Strategic Partnership with
the ILO seeking inter alia to influence labour market and employment conditions
in developing countries. This would be achieved by influencing the outcome of
ILO Conventions and pressurising non-European states to ratify them. Some
success has been recorded in that front, as the EU required the ratification of
ILO core Conventions from Venezuela, Mongolia and El Salvador (Eichhorst
et al. 2010: 40). It is also noteworthy that the EU actively supports the ILO’s
Decent Work Country Programme by offering financial assistance.
The Council Presidency takes over coordination during the ILC on behalf of the
EU. That is very significant given the salience that EU positions have on ILC and
its non-European delegates. Meanwhile the intra institutional struggle on who rep-
resents the Union has not gone away and the sharing of competences is fraught
with difficulties. To illustrate, the Commission has twice (in 1994 and again in
2003) unsuccessfully attempted to formalise the coordination process in the
ILO (Saenen and Orbie 2011). Such formalisation would have offered the Com-
mission a degree of intra institutional authority that member states are reluctant
to concede.
This type of coordination has had a visible effect on the ILO approach. In its
2008 Declaration on ‘Fair Globalisation’, a document ‘marking the most impor-
tant renewal of the organization since the Declaration of Philadelphia’ (ILO
2008: 4), the ILO stressed that employment promotion goes through the upgrading
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of individuals’ skills and competences to meet contemporary challenges (ILO
2008: 9). EU–ILO cooperation was on evidence in the run-up to the Declaration,
as strong internal EU coordination led to agreement with the ILO on the main
policy priorities through tripartite meetings on this subject in 2007 and 2008
(European Commission 2008: 9; Interviews 1, 2 and 5).
A 2009 ILO policy document prepared by the Employment and Social Policy
Committee ‘for discussion and guidance’ reinforces the impression that flexicurity
is a policy issue in which the EU has taken the lead and the ILO has sought to
deepen the concept and expand its reach beyond Europe. It conceives flexicurity
as a clear alternative to the flexibility debate of the 1980s and 1990s and dis-
tinguishes its policy content from the overtly liberal reform drive of the Washing-
ton Consensus period (ILO 2009a).
Even more interestingly, the same document relies on the organisation’s
regional expertise to draw a summary of flexicurity practices focusing on Asia,
Africa and Latin America. It identifies certain flexicurity policies, though these
lack the ‘institutional depth’ found in Europe. The document supports the need
to deepen the flexicurity debate in the developing world and recommends that
policy-makers work towards that goal (ILO 2009a: 13). Doing so could help redir-
ect the debate away from pure flexibility approaches and assist these countries in
setting up institutional frameworks to combine flexibility with security. This,
however, should take place in ways that consider the ‘institutional and fiscal con-
straints’ within which policy-makers operate, an echo of similar EU warnings. The
concluding section leaves no doubt as to the work that the ILO envisages for itself.
Flexicurity is relevant for all countries, not only European ones (ILO 2009a: 14;
Interview 6) and the ILO could do more to broaden its work on flexicurity by iden-
tifying linkages to other flexibility types, such as wage and functional flexibility
(ILO 2009a: 15).
While the overall ILO approach is in harmony with the EU understanding of
flexicurity its tone is less enthusiastic. On the issue of social cohesion and
change in the labour market the ILO strikes a cautious tone and perceives an
imbalance:
Discussions on employment policies, social security and labour
market regulation have shown more concern for competitiveness
and the stimulation of change rather than for social cohesion or
the reconciliation of conflicting interests. (ILO 2006: 17)
One of flexicurity’s most important aspects is the notion of flexibility and chan-
ging jobs over one’s work cycle. The ILO highlights data showing how a stable
employment relationship enhances productivity, employee motivation and invest-
ment in human capital. It is worth noting that the ILO’s desire to stress the more
progressive elements of the flexicurity package is in harmony with ETUC’s point
of view on the subject.
Issues surrounding the definition of the concept also relate to a reluctance to
conceive flexicurity as part of an overall macroeconomic policy strategy that
relates not only to labour laws and flexibility but also the financing of social secur-
ity, demand led economic stimuli and so on (Interview 7). The ILO has become
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somewhat sceptical regarding the usefulness of the term as of late, despite strongly
backing it at first, not least through its flexicurity project in Eastern Europe. Now it
prefers referring to ‘labour market security’ (Auer 2007), that is, policy measures
to protect employees from adverse effects of unemployment whilst in transition
from one job to another. As trade union support for flexicurity policies is declining
and the term comes under fire from a large part of the research community its
future remains vague (Auer 2010).
When it comes to the coordinative part of its discourse on flexicurity, it is clear
that the ILO has been very much influenced by the EU approach and has fully
endorsed the concept’s validity as an acceptable form of reform, though not
without some reservations. The EU influence on the ILO’s coordinative discourse
stems in part from the latter’s effective intra-coordination between various insti-
tutions and prior to major ILO decision-making forums.
Communicative discourse
The ILO began researching the concept in 2000, though it did not define it very
concisely. A large project aiming to enhance flexicurity in Central and Eastern
Europe was launched in 2002 (Cazes 2008: 3). The 2005 European Regional
Meeting ‘encouraged the Organization to pursue tripartite consultations on flexi-
bility and security and facilitate the exchange of good practices’ (Cazes 2008: 3).
Flexicurity could go a long way in supporting the ILO’s Decent Work strategy
(ILO 1999) since it entails all four elements (employment, social protection,
social dialogue and workers’ rights) central to it (Auer and Gazier 2008: 7).
A key ILO document in this respect is ‘Changing Patterns in the World of
Work’, a report coming out of the ILO’ 95th session in 2006. Secretary General
Juan Somavia argued that ‘balancing the need for flexibility and security in a
period of opportunity and uncertainty requires a strong rights-based approach to
the governance of labour markets that fosters social dialogue’ (ILO 2006: viii).
The Secretary General saw flexicurity from the prism of ‘good globalisation’,
that is, part of a global standards setting agenda that sets labour rights at the
heart of the process of adaptation. This is further evident when the report identified
four major trends that affected contemporary labour markets. While technological
innovation and the intensification of competition and trade liberalisation were
clearly identified as drivers of change, the report added the ‘shift in political think-
ing towards greater reliance on markets and a reduced role for the state’ (ILO
2006: 3). Clearly, then, globalisation is conditioned, inter alia, by a new type of
political thinking regarding the right balance between the state and the market.
An important aspect of flexicurity is the issue of unemployment benefits and
striking the right incentives to take up employment. The 2006 report rejected a tar-
geted approach to benefits and backed an active labour market policy combined
with tighter qualifications for benefit recipients. On flexicurity per se the report
underlined the ‘lively character’ of the debate in Europe. Without addressing
the debate directly it adopted a sympathetic tone by stressing how this ‘model
for employment adaptation’ consisted of consultations with unions and public
authorities and was backed up by the social security system (ILO 2006: 55).
Clearly, the rhetoric on flexicurity adopted by the EU is fully compatible with
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the ILO’s raison d’être concerning the need for social dialogue consultation and
inclusion in the policy making process. Moreover, for both organisations flexicur-
ity is a means to an end. For the EU it is a fitting way to fulfil the requirements of
the Lisbon Agenda (and, following Lisbon’s failure, the Europe2020 targets on
labour market policy) and for the ILO it is perfectly compatible with the
Decent Work strategy.
The ILO released a fact sheet on flexicurity on the occasion of its eighth Euro-
pean regional meeting in 2009. This document directly contrasted flexicurity with
flexibility. Given ILO’s mission and work on flexicurity as well as its previous
policy pronouncements on this subject it is clear that the organisation criticises
flexibility whilst endorsing the innovative and ‘new’ character of flexicurity.
A positive and negative undertone to the two processes can be discerned:
Policymakers all over Europe are facing a crucial challenge of reg-
ulating a rapidly evolving labour market in the context of a globa-
lized economy. Will they listen to calls made for greater flexibility
or can they place their trust in a ‘flexicurity’ model: new ways of
balancing flexibility and security in relation to employment,
income and social protection? (ILO 2009c: 1)
Finally, the document is significant because, in confirmation of data presented
above, it assigned a primary role to the EU in dealing with the concept whilst
seeing it as ‘exportable’ elsewhere too:
In the EU-15 increased emphasis has been placed on seeking a
better combination of flexibility and security . . . ILO analysis . . .
has also confirmed the relevance of the flexicurity approach for
the new EU member states and non-EU countries, where high
levels of flexibility are currently combined with low employment
and income security. (ILO 2009c: 1)
The attempt by the International Labour Office to disseminate the flexicurity
concept beyond Europe has taken a concrete form. The Employment Policy
Department released a study4 in 2007 devoted to flexicurity in developing
countries (De Goobi 2007). It stressed the need to take the flexicurity debate
further and embed it in the debate taking place in the developing world. Flexicur-
ity is preferred to flexibility; this is particularly obvious considering the frequent
references to the high degree of flexibility already evident in the developing world,
as well as the low income and employment (in)security that informality and weak
state institutions offer.
The report confirmed the relevance of flexicurity for the non-western world and
mentioned concrete policy initiatives. These included India’s 2005 Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Act, which promoted employment coupled with social security
for landless families (De Goobi 2007: 43–4). The Indian Act followed the prin-
ciples of the ILO’s ‘New Consensus’ in 2001, which stressed the need to offer
social security coverage to the informally employed and create conditions for
decent work through income security. The initiative by Uruguay to set up an
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ear-marked tax supporting social security schemes targeting home workers and
informal casual workers was part of the same paradigm.
As in its coordinative discourse then, the ILO follows the EU lead when com-
municating flexicurity. It expresses some reservations on its implementation on
the field, possibly reflecting its different mandate. Yet there is little doubt that it
sees flexicurity as an alternative to the flexibility dominated policies and policy
prescriptions of the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the discourse the ILO embraces
makes clear that this is a concept relevant beyond Europe and this provides the
background for its decision to engage in flexicurity oriented work in other parts
of the world. Finally, with reference to globalisation, the ILO’s discourse also
accepts the inevitability of globalisation when assessed on the basis of changes
in technology and labour markets. Nevertheless, it mentions the ideological
elements behind this process and ascribes ideational as well as material character-
istics to globalisation.
Conclusion
The EU and the ILO develop their coordinative and communicative discourses
quite differently. As far as the coordinative discourse is concerned, the EU
counts on external consultation, that is, consulting relevant NGOs, associations,
employer and firm federations and trade unions. It does so as a result of its ’sta-
keholding’ understanding on public policy and its desire to incorporate views
outside the institutions so as to legitimise its role and function. The main form
of coordination at EU level resides with the efforts undertaken primarily by the
Commission, often in cooperation with the European Council. As it has been
shown, the Commission after the Delors era and the European Council identify
globalisation as a real policy constraint in the labour market calling for change,
hence their embrace of flexicurity. On the other hand the ILO’s coordinative dis-
course is qualitatively different from the European Union’s yet also strongly
related to it. It is different because of the organisation’s reliance on the Inter-
national Labour Office to produce informed views on the current state of the
labour market that will feed into decision making. Moreover, the ILO does not
engage in the type of stakeholders-driven consultation the EU engages in. Yet
our data shows how the ILO’s coordinative discourse is influenced by EU activism
on the field, not least through the latter’s coordination efforts at ILCs and the
acceptance of EU leadership on the issue.
Whereas the EU uses globalisation as a policy constraint when coordinating its
discourse on flexicurity, communicative discourse reveals that the Commission
makes use of globalisation as a rhetorical device to strengthen its own role
within the Union’s institutional matrix and division of power. Concretely, the
Commission seeks to expand the implementation and use of flexicurity so as to
strengthen its own role in the EU, given the key role it plays in coordinating
the Union’s and member state policies in that field through initiatives such as
the OMC and policy instruments such as the EES. This logic is not transferable
to the ILO. What we observe here instead is a more guarded approach to the idea-
tional content of globalisation when applied to labour market policy and an
attempt to communicate parts of the flexicurity agenda more amenable to
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workers’ interests. This is combined with an acceptance of EU leadership in
setting the parameters of the flexicurity agenda and a desire to communicate the
concept beyond Europe. Finally, the EU through both the Commission and
member states is actively contributing to the message on flexicurity the ILO
seeks to communicate.
Focusing on discourse has exposed interesting differences between the insti-
tutional reality of the cooperation between the EU and the ILO and the more
manipulative use of globalisation at the discursive level. It can be argued that glo-
balisation and Europeanisation are interwoven at an institutional level but at a dis-
cursive level globalisation is usually presented as the engine of change, even if this
is not always true. Distinguishing between coordinative and communicative dis-
course has sometimes proven to be a theoretical exercise rather than an empirical
reality because neither organisation consciously differentiates its coordinative
from its communicative discourse. An additional difficulty is that by analysing
discourse at a more complex multilevel environment, different layers of coordina-
tive and communicative discourse are revealed. For example before the ‘entry’ of
flexicurity at the EU level diverse coordinative and communicative discourses on
flexicurity were formed at member state level (Antoniades 2008). This prior dis-
cursive layer is important because, as it is shown in the article, it has affected the
EU coordinative and communicative discourse on flexicurity. Even more signifi-
cantly, the existence of different layers of discourse and the different styles of lea-
dership exercised by the Commission show that discourse is dynamic and not
static.
However, the distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse
offers important insights in the way globalisation and Europeanisation shape the
concept of flexicurity at different times. The EU’s coordinative discourse on flex-
icurity is structured around the alleged constraints that globalisation is placing on
its room for policy manoeuvre. The ILO’s coordinative discourse is structured
around the EU’s solution to the problem, and flexicurity is seen as a ‘best practice’
transferable from the European to the international level.
The communicative discourse of both the EU and the ILO instrumentally uses
globalisation in a variety of ways to present and legitimise flexicurity to the
general public. We can go a step further and argue, in agreement with Jacoby
and Meunier (2010) that the EU has been a central actor in shaping the concept
of flexicurity and via the ILO the global environment of labour market policy.
In contrast to what a large part of the literature suggests, the EU is not acting as
an antidote to globalisation’s alleged imperatives on labour market reform.
Rather, it seeks to export its own policy preferences and sees itself constrained
by globalisation in what it can do. The implications of this approach are far-reach-
ing. They suggest that, should the parameters of the EU discourse concerning
labour market reform remain unchanged, the Union is likely to continue trying
to exit the economic crisis by adopting yet more ‘flexibility’ policies at the
expense of employee security. If globalisation calls for more competitiveness
via more flexible labour markets, a paradigm well established in the EU today
at member state and Commission level, then the lure of flexicurity will increas-
ingly concentrate on its employer-friendly solutions and less on what it offers
to workers. One could in fact argue that such a trend is already evident, and the
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ETUC position on the subject presented above suggests as much. Through the
Commission’s coordinative and especially communicative discourse flexicurity
serves as a model for the rest of the international community. Even if the ILO
has not adopted flexicurity uncritically, it considers it to be the framework
within which its labour policy should stand and interprets it as a refreshing
change from the old, flexibility-obsessed approach.
Looking at the international rather than the domestic level to understand the
relationship of globalisation and Europeanisation has proven fruitful. Using the
EU and the ILO as institutional manifestations of Europeanisation and globalisa-
tion, respectively, reveals the institutional interdependence of the two phenomena.
More comparisons of the EU with other international organisations in setting dis-
courses, norms, rules and thus state policies would be of great interest.
Notes
Many thanks to our interviewees at the ILO and the EU for their time and useful insights. Comments and sugges-
tions by the participants of the Political Economy Research Workshop, University of Sheffield, December 2011,
as well as Colin Hay, Simon Bulmer, Vivien Schmidt, and three anonymous referees who greatly enhanced the
quality of the article. All remaining errors are entirely our own responsibility.
1. We thank an anonymous referee for alerting us to this dimension of the debate.
2. The similarity in outlook between the views expressed in this consultation paper and the policy stance adopted
by the European Commission and BusinessEurope on the issue of change and modernisation is evident. Note,
however, that ‘Europe’s Social Reality’ is not an official Commission document and does not necessarily
express Commission views.
3. Unless otherwise stated this section draws on Boockman 2003.
4. This is an ILO publication. Note, however, that the document includes a disclaimer stating that the author
expresses personal views and recommendations.
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